Launch versus acquire a show and how to price the difference
Launch versus acquire a show becomes one comparison once both routes are discounted to today. An acquisition buys contribution immediately for cash. A launch buys a delayed and uncertain stream for a few years of funded losses. The decision turns on the survival probability at which the delayed stream is worth more than the price.
The board paper has two options on it. Option one is an acquisition of a show in an adjacent sector at 8 times EBITDA of 2.4 million. Option two is a launch into the same sector, which the team believes reaches a similar scale by its eighth edition. Option one has a price. Option two has a plan. The two are presented in different units and the discussion goes round in circles for forty minutes.
Launch versus acquire a show only becomes decidable when both sides are expressed as cash flows against a common discount rate, and the comparison then collapses to a single question that has a numerical answer. That question is what survival probability the launch needs before it beats the price.
Everything below assumes an 11 per cent discount rate, chosen once and applied to both routes. The rate matters and I come back to it.
What the acquisition actually costs
Eight times 2.4 million is 19.2 million, and the fees, warranty insurance and integration set up add roughly 600,000, so 19.8 million leaves the building at completion. From the first full year you own 2.4 million of contribution.
Two things about that price are worth stating plainly. First, it includes a control premium, because the seller does not have to sell. The published deals show how large that gets in a competitive process. Informa's recommended cash offer for Ascential, announced on 24 July 2024, was 568 pence per share in cash, valuing Ascential at approximately 1.2 billion pounds on a fully diluted basis and representing a 53 per cent premium to the closing price before the offer period. Informa completed the acquisition on 8 October 2024. Whatever multiple you think you are paying, the premium is the part the seller's existing owners keep.
Second, 19.8 million is certain. There is diligence risk about what you bought, and there is no risk at all about what you paid. That asymmetry is the real difference between the two routes, and the arithmetic below exists to price it.
What a launch costs, edition by edition
A launch into the same sector runs at a loss until the floor is full enough to cover the venue, the build and the acquisition marketing.
Take a plausible profile. Edition one loses 1.35 million, edition two loses 850,000, edition three loses 350,000, edition four scrapes 150,000 of positive contribution, and the show then climbs to 900,000, 1.6 million and 2.2 million before settling at 2.4 million from edition eight. Cumulative cash out before the first positive edition is 1.35 plus 0.85 plus 0.35, which is 2.55 million in nominal terms.
Discount those three years at 11 per cent. Year one, 1.35 divided by 1.11 is 1.216. Year two, 0.85 divided by 1.2321 is 0.690. Year three, 0.35 divided by 1.367631 is 0.256. The present value of the funded losses is 2.162 million.
So the launch costs 2.162 million in present value against the acquisition's 19.8 million, which is roughly a ninth. It also delivers its 2.4 million seven years later than the acquisition does, and it might never deliver it at all.
The break-even survival probability
Here is the part that turns the argument into a number.
Money arriving seven years later is worth less. At 11 per cent, the factor is 1 divided by 1.11 to the seventh, which is 1 divided by 2.076161, or 0.4817. So a stream of 2.4 million a year that starts in year eight is worth 48.17 per cent of the same stream starting in year one.
The acquisition price tells you what that stream starting in year one is worth to a market: 19.8 million. Take that as the value of an immediate 2.4 million stream. A launch that survives therefore delivers 0.4817 multiplied by 19.8 million, which is 9.537 million of present value.
Now weight it by survival. Expected value equals the survival probability multiplied by 9.537 million. Set that equal to the launch's cost of 2.162 million and solve. The probability is 2.162 divided by 9.537, which is 0.2267, or 22.7 per cent.
That is the whole decision on one line. If more than about 23 per cent of your launches reach a mature scale, launching beats paying 8 times. If fewer do, buy. Groups with a working launch machine sit comfortably above that line and groups without one sit well below it, which is why the same board paper produces opposite answers at two different companies and both are right.
The number moves with the price, and it moves in the direction you would expect. At 10 times rather than 8, the acquisition costs 24.6 million including fees, the surviving launch is worth 0.4817 times 24.6, or 11.85 million, and the break-even probability falls to 2.162 divided by 11.85, which is 18.2 per cent. Every turn of multiple the seller wins makes building look better, which is worth saying out loud in the negotiation. What actually moves that multiple is a separate subject, handled in the drivers behind an event business multiple.
Why relatedness changes the answer
The launch cost above treats 2.162 million as spent and gone. That is too pessimistic for a group with several shows in adjacent sectors, and there is a good published treatment of why.
Lieberman, Lee and Folta examined entry, exit and resource redeployment in the Strategic Management Journal in 2017, combining resource relatedness with the economics of sunk costs. Their argument is that a diversified firm which can redeploy resources back into related businesses when a new venture underperforms faces lower effective sunk costs on that venture, and lower sunk costs make exit easier. The practical consequence is that entry into related markets is cheaper for a diversified firm than the headline investment suggests.
For an event group this reads almost literally. A launch team pulled off a failed show goes back onto the existing sales floor with sector knowledge, an exhibitor list and a set of relationships that the group keeps. The venue deposit is lost, the marketing spend is lost, and the people are not. If half of the 2.55 million nominal loss is staff cost that would have been spent anyway, the true incremental cost of the failed launch is closer to 1.1 million of present value, and the break-even survival probability drops from 22.7 per cent to around 11.5 per cent.
That effect only exists where the launch really is adjacent. A launch into a sector where your group has no shows, no data and no salespeople with contacts is a standalone bet, and none of the redeployment argument applies to it.
When would I buy anyway?
Three situations, and none of them is about the arithmetic.
When the sector has an incumbent event that already owns the buyer relationships, launching against it usually fails regardless of your survival rate, because the exhibitors will not fund two stands and the buyers will not take two weeks out. Paying for the incumbent is the only route in.
When speed has a value the model does not carry. A group preparing for its own sale in two years cannot wait seven for a launch to mature, and the acquisition converts cash into reported EBITDA immediately. That is a real motive and it deserves to be stated as one rather than dressed up as strategy.
When the target holds something you cannot build, most often a multi year venue contract in a constrained city or a licensing relationship with the sector's trade body. Those are assets with no launch equivalent.
Where this stops
The break-even probability rests on treating the acquisition price as a fair measure of what a mature 2.4 million stream is worth, and in a competitive auction it is a measure of what the most optimistic bidder thought it was worth. If you overpaid by 20 per cent, the break-even probability you computed is 20 per cent too low and the launch looked better than it was for a reason that has nothing to do with launching.
The discount rate does real work too. At 9 per cent the seven year delay factor rises to 0.5470, the surviving launch is worth 10.83 million and the break-even probability falls to 20.0 per cent. At 13 per cent the factor drops to 0.4251, the surviving launch is worth 8.42 million and the probability rises to 25.7 per cent. The range is narrow enough that the conclusion holds, which is the useful thing to know about it, and wide enough that quoting 22.7 per cent to one decimal place would be false precision.
The largest weakness is the survival probability itself, which most groups quote from memory or from an industry figure somebody heard at a conference. Both are worthless here. The number has to come from your own launches, with the failures counted, and computing it honestly is its own piece of work. Pricing launches that are already sitting inside somebody else's five year plan is a different exercise again, covered in valuing a launch pipeline you are being sold.
This week, take the last acquisition your group looked at, whether or not you bought it, and compute the break-even survival probability against the price on the table. Two divisions and a discount factor. Then put that percentage next to the number of launches your group has attempted in the last decade, and see which side of the line you are on before the next board paper arrives, since the answer feeds directly into how the wider portfolio and synergy plan gets built.
Questions people ask about launch versus acquire a show
- Is it cheaper to launch a trade show or buy one?
- It depends on the survival rate you can actually demonstrate. Launching costs a few years of losses instead of a large cash payment, but it delivers contribution years later and only if the show survives. Compute the survival probability at which the discounted launch stream matches the acquisition price, then compare it with your own record.
- What discount rate should be used to compare a launch with an acquisition?
- Use the same rate for both, because the point of the exercise is comparability rather than precision. Somewhere near your weighted cost of capital works, and the answer should be tested at two or three points across a defensible range. If the ranking flips inside that range, the two routes are close enough that other factors decide.
- Why do acquisition prices include a premium over market value?
- Because control has to be bought from someone who already owns the asset and does not have to sell. In its 2024 recommended cash offer for Ascential, Informa offered 568 pence per share, which valued the company at around 1.2 billion pounds and represented a 53 per cent premium to the undisturbed closing price.
Related reading
- Computing a trade show launch success rate from your own history
- Valuing a show launch pipeline without paying twice for the same growth